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Air Dispersion Study for LP Flare Upgrade in Northern Oman

Overview of the Far West New Flare Project

Located in Northern Oman, the Far West New Flare Project aims to upgrade operational efficiency by replacing an existing low-pressure flare with a state-of-the-art system. The new flare is designed to handle a significantly increased gas capacity of 41 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD), compared to the previous system’s capacity of 36 MMSCFD. This upgrade addresses key operational challenges, including instrument air failures and emergency shutdowns, while ensuring improved management of combustion emissions.

To comply with Oman’s environmental regulations, the project included a comprehensive Air Dispersion Study utilizing advanced dispersion modeling software. This study assessed the impact of the upgraded flare system on ambient air quality and ensured adherence to Oman Ministerial Decision MD 41/2017.

Objectives of the Air Dispersion Study

The primary goal of the Air Dispersion Study was to:

  • Evaluate Ground-Level Concentrations (GLCs) of pollutants emitted by the LP flare.
  • Ensure compliance with Oman’s Ambient Air Quality Standards as outlined in MD 41/2017.
  • Analyze the dispersion and potential environmental impact of key pollutants, including Non-Methane Hydrocarbons (NMHC), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), Carbon Monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM2.5).

Methodology

A flowchart titled 'Methodology' with four interconnected green circular nodes: Meteorological Data Collection, Dispersion Modeling, Scenario Assessment, and Compliance Evaluation
Flowchart showing key methodology steps

The Air Dispersion Study employed a systematic approach using advanced modeling techniques:

  1. Meteorological Data Collection: Meteorological data were sourced from Ibri, Oman’s nearest weather station, to incorporate local atmospheric conditions such as wind patterns, temperature, and humidity.
  2. Dispersion Modeling: State-of-the-art simulation software was utilized to predict pollutant dispersion based on emission rates, meteorological inputs, and local topography. The model accounted for atmospheric turbulence, mixing height, and other critical factors influencing dispersion.
  3. Scenario Assessment: Various operational scenarios were analyzed, with timeframes including 1-hour, 3-hour, 8-hour, and 24-hour averages, to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of emissions under different conditions.
  4. Compliance Evaluation: Predicted GLCs were compared with the threshold limits defined by MD 41/2017 to assess regulatory compliance.

Key Findings

The Air Dispersion Study revealed that the maximum predicted GLCs for all assessed pollutants were well within the permissible limits set by Oman’s MD 41/2017 regulations. Key findings include:

  • Non-Methane Hydrocarbons (NMHC): Levels remained below the specified threshold.
  • Sulfur Dioxide (SO2): Dispersion was minimal, with concentrations within safe limits.
  • Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2): Predicted values did not exceed regulatory standards.
  • Carbon Monoxide (CO): Emissions were effectively managed, ensuring compliance.
  • Particulate Matter (PM2.5): GLCs adhered to prescribed limits, safeguarding public health.

Conclusion

The Air Dispersion Study for the Far West New Flare Project underscores the importance of predictive modeling in environmental assessments. By leveraging advanced simulation tools, the study ensured that the upgraded flare system met Oman’s stringent air quality standards. Key outcomes include:

  • Enhanced operational efficiency with a modernized flare system.
  • Compliance with environmental regulations, fostering sustainable industrial practices.
  • A framework for proactive air quality management, contributing to long-term environmental sustainability in Oman.

This project highlights the role of innovative engineering solutions in balancing productivity and environmental stewardship. With effective environmental management practices in place, the Far West New Flare Project sets a benchmark for sustainable industrial development in Oman.

Introduction

The Air Dispersion study presents a comprehensive assessment of air quality impacts associated with the Liquid Petroleum Industry Complex (LPIC) Project. This study evaluates emissions from various point sources, including heaters, flares, boilers, and incinerators, to ensure compliance with Omani environmental regulations.

Objective

The Study Report conducted assesses the impact on the air quality associated with the LPIC Project. The study aims to evaluate the emissions from various sources, ensuring compliance with Omani environmental regulations.

Methodology

The study utilized advanced air dispersion modeling techniques, covering a 15 km x 15 km area surrounding the Shell Chemical Unit (SCU) and the polymer plant. Key features of the methodology include

The image showcases a visual representation of a methodology comprising three interconnected elements. The first element, Meteorological Data Integration, depicts weather monitoring equipment in a desert-like environment with clear skies and wind indicators. The second element, Conservative Approach, highlights industrial facilities emitting smoke, symbolizing risk assessment amidst pollution, accompanied by computer screens displaying analytical data. The third element, Simulation Software, illustrates a futuristic digital interface with vibrant graphics, including an hourglass icon, weather symbols, and statistical charts on a desktop setup. All elements are unified under a green framework labeled Methodology, emphasizing structured analysis.
  • Meteorological Data Integration: Wind speed, temperature, and surface roughness were included for precise predictions.
  • Conservative Approach: Maximum predicted emissions simulated worst-case scenarios.
  • Simulation Software: Pollutant dispersion was analyzed under varied meteorological conditions.

Key Findings

The study focused on several air pollutants:

  • Particulate Matter (PM10)
  • Sulfur Dioxide (SO2)
  • Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)
  • Carbon Monoxide (CO)
  • Non-Methane Hydrocarbons (NMHC)
  • Unburned Hydrocarbons (UHC)

Both normal and emergency scenarios were assessed, and the results were benchmarked against Environmental Authority (EA) standards. Emissions under maximum operational conditions were found to be within the acceptable limits of the Oman Ambient Air Quality Standards

Conclusions

The air quality assessment for the LPIC Project determined that operational emissions will not significantly impact local air quality, and compliance with environmental standards is maintained. The modeling incorporated a comprehensive examination of both normal and emergency emission scenarios, accounting for conservative assumptions to ensure the reliability of the results.

Overview

The Air dispersion study has been conducted for the AP Flare Package at the Al Barakah Oil, Gas, and Water Handling Facility in Northern Oman. The study aimed to evaluate the ground-level concentrations (GLC) of pollutants emitted from the flare and to ensure compliance with Oman’s ambient air quality standards as stipulated by Ministerial Decision (MD) 41/2017.

The Al Barakah Oil, Gas, and Water Handling Facility is undergoing an expansion project aimed at improving its operational efficiency and environmental compliance. This case study details the air dispersion modeling performed to evaluate the ground-level concentrations (GLC) from the air emissions of the newly proposed AP flare stack. The study leverages, a highly sophisticated atmospheric dispersion model, to assess compliance with Oman's ambient air quality standards as regulated by Ministerial Decision (MD) 41/2017.

As part of an expansion initiative, the Al Barakah facility is enhancing its infrastructure, including the installation of a new flare system designed to manage emissions effectively.

Project Background

The first phase involves installing various infrastructure, including a new flare pit and a production separator, while subsequent phases will introduce additional equipment for oil shipping and gas processing. The AP flare’s design and performance were assessed to ensure that emissions remain within permissible limits as per environmental regulations.

Objective

The primary objective of the air dispersion study is to evaluate the expected GLCs from the AP flare and to ascertain compliance with the Oman Ambient Air Quality Standards. The pollutants of interest included Non-Methane Hydrocarbons (NMHC), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), Carbon Monoxide (CO), and particulate matter (PM2.5).

Methodology

The modeling process involved several key steps:

An infographic visually depicting a methodological process through four interconnected circular icons. The first icon features a weather station and equipment under a clear sky, symbolizing meteorological data collection. The second icon shows industrial emissions spreading over a landscape, representing dispersion modeling. The third icon illustrates an industrial site with atmospheric and ground effects, signifying assessment scenarios. The fourth icon showcases a futuristic cityscape with sustainable infrastructure, indicating compliance evaluation. Each icon is visually distinct and connected, creating a cohesive and professional design.
Methodology
  1. Meteorological Data Collection: Meteorological data were sourced from the nearest station in Ibri, Oman, to understand local wind patterns and atmospheric conditions.
  2. Dispersion Modelling: A Simulation Software was employed to simulate the dispersion of air pollutants based on emission rates and meteorological parameters. The model accounts for various atmospheric factors such as turbulence, mixing height, and the influence of local topography.
  3. Assessment Scenarios: The model was applied to predict GLCs under various operating scenarios and timeframes (1-hour, 3-hour, 8-hour, and 24-hour averages).
  4. Compliance Evaluation: The results were compared against the thresholds set by MD 41/2017 to determine compliance with air quality regulations.

Key Findings

The modeling results indicated that the maximum predicted GLCs for all assessed pollutants from the AP flare remained within the limits prescribed by MD 41/2017. Specifically, the study found the following:

  • NO2, CO, and NMHC concentrations were compliant with the standards.

The selected stack height was deemed adequate for the effective dispersion of emissions, reducing potential air quality impacts

Conclusion

The air dispersion study reassured that the Al Barakah Oil, Gas, and Water Handling Facility's expansion efforts meet the necessary environmental standards for air quality. This study highlights the facility's commitment to maintaining compliance with local regulations while supporting operational enhancements.

With effective environmental management practices in place, the facility continues to contribute to sustainable Industrial development in Oman, ensuring both productivity and environmental sustainability are prioritized.

Project Overview

The Gas Detectors Zoning Study for the Sachal Gas Processing Complex at MPCL aims to assess and establish appropriate zoning for gas detectors to ensure safety and effective monitoring of potential hazards at the facility

The Sachal Gas Processing Complex (SGPC) managed by MPCL includes two primary processing facilities: the Gas Process Facility for TIPU and the Gas Process Facility for GORU. This study focuses on ensuring the optimal placement and efficiency of flammable gas detectors across the complex, ensuring the early detection and mitigation of hydrocarbon gas leaks.

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Facilities at Sachal Gas Processing Complex

  • TIPU Facility
    • Process Overview:
      • Multiphase well fluid from Tipu 1 and 2 wellheads is directed to a three-phase intake separator. Key operations include:
      • Gas Measurement: Sales gas is metered at the 2-stage membrane unit, while HP raw gas is measured before further processing.
      • Hydrocarbon Condensate Management: Condensate is stored in tanks after passing through a degasser.
      • Produced Water Treatment: Water from the separator flows through degassing and CPI units into ponds.
  • GORU Facility
    • Process Overview:
      • Goru wellheads fluid undergoes separation and pretreatment to reduce CO2 levels before processing through amine sweetening and glycol dehydration units. Key operations include:
        • Gas Integration: Mixed with TIPU-treated gas and metered.
        • Condensate Handling: Similar to TIPU, condensate is degassed and stored.
        • Produced Water Management: Directed through CPI systems into ponds.
  • HRL Facility
    • Process Overview:
      • Gas from HRL wells is compressed and routed for further processing, either through Goru Membranes Pretreatment Skids or ASU Units, enabling seamless sales and operations.

Scope

The scope of this study is to ensure the flammable gas detection are in place to check early detection of HC Gas leaks/accumulation/migration.,

Fire and Gas Mapping Study (F&G)

Objectives

In Fire and Gas mapping study (F&G) the goal of the gas detection study is to make sure that gas detectors are installed in accordance with the project's gas detection philosophy based on gas detector layouts, to find any gaps based on the study, and to offer suggestions where necessary regarding the quantity and positioning of the different detectors.

Fire & Gas detection:

Rapid early detection of an emerging gas leak is a key factor in the effectiveness of a fire protection system, and a rapid response can minimise the potential for an escalation. In order to limit the impact of releases on personnel, the environment, assets, and reputation, a good fire and gas detection system provides detection provisions that are in line with the threats prevalent throughout the site. Detection can be performed using personnel or protective equipment, equipment detection systems include:

  • A manual call point that staff members use to issue a warning
  • Gas detection, which provides a warning on gas leaks. (Flammable)

Methodology

  • Step 1: Hazardous Area Identification
    • Hazardous Area Identification Based on the facility plot design and process simulation report, the Sachal Gas Processing Complex will be subjected to a thorough desktop assessment in order to identify hazardous regions with flammable gas hazards. These areas will then be divided into various hazardous detection or mapping areas.
  • Step 2: Hazardous Area Characterization
    • On the basis of the aforementioned identification, a desktop study will be conducted to characterize great risks for accidents, considering fluid properties and release quantities using PIDs and the Process Simulation Report. Additionally, using the plot plan and 3D model, locations that are likely to accumulate flammable gases will be classified as open, crowded, or confined.
  • Step 3: Determination of Risk Volume / characteristic cloud for detection
    • Risk volume characterized as the volume within which the accumulation of hydrocarbon gas may result in a potential explosion or flash fire, causing significant harm to personnel and assets. Typically, it is determined based on the guidelines outlined in Shell DEP 32.30.20.11, considering the area characterization, such as open, congested, or confined, and is often expressed in terms of diameter.
  • Step 4: Modelling.
    • The 3D geometry file is imported into the software and the gas detectors are placed based on the provisional layout for gas detector at the dangerous zone.
  • Step 5: Coverage Mapping
    • The preliminary evaluation of coverage to achieve the specified target will be conducted by utilizing the existing detectors position. If any limitations are identified, further steps will be taken, including the installation of new detectors or relocating existing ones, to ensure that the detectors are appropriately positioned to sense and detect potential gas dispersion in that area.
  • Step 6: Optimization/Detector Layout Definition
    • Redo the above procedures for all loss of containment scheme. Optimize the detector position height or modify the detector position to accommodate hydrocarbon release dispersion coverage if detectors prove inadequate to detect or observe the dispersion.
This image presents a step-by-step flowchart illustrating the methodology for hazardous area detection and optimization. It begins with Hazardous Area Identification, followed by Hazardous Area Characterization, Risk Volume Definition, and Determination of Characteristic Cloud of Detection. The next step involves 3D Modelling/Placing Detectors, which leads to Check Coverage Results. If the target is Not Met/Largely Exceeded, the process loops back to Optimization/Detector Layout for adjustments. A decision point, labeled Yes/No, determines if the modeling meets the target. If Yes, the process ends at End (Modelling). If No, the optimization continues. This flowchart, organized with green boxes and arrows, visually represents the iterative process for achieving optimal detector layout and coverage in hazardous area detection.
Methodology

Executive Summary

Gas Detection Study for this project has been performed using the appropriate software and the results were presented in the below table format.

Based on the zone-wise study, a considerable No of detectors have been relocated within their respective zones. Furthermore, a considerable No. of detectors have been removed from their respective zones. Additionally, the required no of detectors, and point-type gas detectors have been added to their corresponding zones prior to the existing detectors after relocation.

Project Summary

Elixir Engineering of Oman was awarded to perform detailed engineering and Technical safety studies for Risk assessment and implement appropriate measures to manage them effectively. The aim is to optimise production while ensuring safety through comprehensive Hazard identification and Mitigation strategies.

The objective of this project is to reduce the backpressures and increase the production to know the hidden potential before going for full field development of the field.

  • PDO (Petroleum Development Oman) have plan to start production from 4 new wells in Marmul West (MMW) field & 1 No. from Amjad field in Oman.
  • These wells are highly viscous oil wells with API gravity of 20 and water cut of zero.
  • Since the viscosity of oil is very high it has safety procedures have been proposed to dilute with the water to reduce the oil viscosity and make the flow-able.
  • The safety measure approach is to reduce the fluid viscosity. Oil has the tendency to form emulsions (mixture of two liquids that usually don't mix well together) with water.
  • The emulsion viscosity increases with increase in water cut up to the inversion point. However, on further addition of water the fluid viscosity is equal to the continuous phase i.e. water.
  • By adding water to the oil to cross the inversion point; the mixture viscosity shall be reduced thereby reducing the backpressures.
  • In absence of LAB data i.e. emulsion viscosity curves, it has been decided to maintain water cut at 70% and viscosity of continuous phase has been considered for the calculation.
  • Under this project, various options for adding water to gross having no water are studied and most appropriate/workable/optimized option is selected based on steady state hydraulic calculation criteria.

The Major Scope of this Project is Briefly Described Below:

Amjad Field

  • One MSV with slots for oil producing wells at Amjad field.
  • Gross fluid, CS+PE/Roto, 300# A/G pipeline from proposed MSV located in Amjad field & MSV located in MMW field Oman to tie-in location proposed on existing manifold located in Marmul Alpha Gathering Station.
  • Piping Spool for Coriolis meter and Water Cut meter.
  • Provision for Mobile Well Testing Unit (MWTU).
  • One Relief/ Maintenance Pit with a level transmitter.
  • 1 no of Full Flow relief valve on the MSV test header.
  • CS+ Roto lined A /G dilution water supply manifold with slots.
  • Engineering scope of CS, 300#, A/G dilution water distribution pipeline and the dilution water hook-up at the respective oil producer wellheads with electromagnetic flowmeter and associated valves for individual oil producer wells. The execution of the dilution water pipeline system will be done by OSE2 team.
  • DG set is used for power supply at the wellheads in absence of OHL.

MMW Field

  • One MSV with slots for oil producing wells at MWW (Marmul West) field Oman.
  • Piping Spool for Coriolis meter and Water Cut meter.
  • Provision for Mobile Well Testing Unit (MWTU).
  • Full Flow relief valves + 1 Installed spare at Marmul West.
  • Full Flow relief valve on MSV test header.
  • One Relief/ Maintenance pit with a level transmitter.
  • CS+ Roto lined A /G dilution water supply manifold with slots.
  • Engineering scope CS,  300#, A/G dilution water distribution pipeline and the dilution water hook-up at the respective oil producer wellheads with electromagnetic flowmeter and associated valves for individual oil producer wells. The execution of the dilution water pipeline system will be done by OSE2 team.
  • DG set is used for power supply at the wellheads in absence of OHL.

The engineers of Elixir Engineering have conducted the listed technical safety studies for the Amjad and MMW (Marmul West) Hookup project in Oman, focusing on comprehensive Hazard identification and Mitigation strategies.

Safety Studies

Hazardous Area Classification (HAC)

What is Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) - The process of dividing a facility into hazardous and non-hazardous sections and then further subdividing the hazardous parts into zones is known as area classification.

  • A three-dimensional place that requires extra care in Hazardous equipment design and construction hazard assessment as well as in controlling other potential ignition sources is known as a Hazardous Area Classification (HAC).
  • This is because flammable atmospheres are expected to be present there at certain frequencies.
    • Zone Classification: Zones are created inside hazardous locations according to the probability and length of a flammable atmosphere.
    • Zone 0: The area of a dangerous area when there is a constant or prolonged presence of combustible air.
    • Zone 1: The portion of a dangerous location where the likelihood of a hazard flammable environment during regular operations is high.
    • Zone 2: The portion of a flammable hazard sign location where there is little chance of a flammable environment during regular operations and, in the event that it does, it will only last briefly.
    • Non-hazardous areas: Regions not covered by any of the aforementioned categories.

Source and grade of release: Any location from which a flammable gas, flammable vapour, or flammable liquid may be released into the atmosphere is considered a source of release for the purposes of area categorisation.

  • The expected frequency and duration of three grades of release are defined.
  • Continuous grade release: A release that happens often and at brief intervals, is virtually continuous, or is both.
  • Primary grade release: A release that is planned for in operating procedures, meaning it is one that is expected to happen on a regular or infrequent basis during normal operation.
  • Release classified as secondary grade: One that, in any case, will only happen seldom and for brief periods of time and is unlikely to happen during regular operations.

Fluid Categories

FluidDescription
AA combustible liquid that would quickly and significantly evaporate upon discharge,
This category includes:
(a) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammable liquid.
(b) Any combustible liquid that has reached a temperature high enough to yield more than 40% volume vaporisation upon release and no external heat input. 
BA flammable liquid that does not fall under category A yet is hot enough to boil when released.
CAn ignitable liquid that does not fall under category A or B but that, upon release, may reach a  temperature higher than its flash point or condense into a flammable mist or spray.
 
G(i)A typical methane-rich natural gas.
G(ii)Refinery hydrogen.

Fire & Gas Dispersion Explosion Assessment (FGDEA)

  • By identifying and assessing potential fire and explosion hazards, the FGDEA seeks to ensure that the facility layout minimizes the probability of escalation to the greatest extent that is practically practicable.
  • According to PDO SP-1258 (Quantitative Risk Assessment Specification), Physical Effects Modeling (PEM) is used to assess the impact of credible leaks and ascertain the likelihood of escalation.
  • According to the probable sources of leakage (PSLs), the study assesses the physical effects of hydrocarbon emissions as well as the possibility of harm to workers from flammable and hazardous releases.
  • As far as is practical, the physical effects modelling completed as part of the FGDEA will be used to optimise the Hook-Up Project, mitigate escalation, and create an intrinsically safe plot based on PDO SP-1127 & SP-1190.
  • It will also be used to confirm that the current Maintenance drain pit vent pipe layout is appropriate in accordance with DEP 80.45.10.10-Gen requirements.

The Objectives of this Study

  • Determine all plausible hydrocarbon hazardous events (e.g., jet fire, flash fire, pool fire, flammable gas dispersion, and explosion);
  • Evaluate the effects of the final results resulting from releases;
  • Evaluate the toxic impacts in accordance with the requirements in SP-1190;
  • Evaluate the potential impact on adjacent units as well as buildings (if included in the project scope), taking into account the location of the potential releases;
  • Give a warning about the possibility of an explosion and fire escalation.
  • Determine protection / mitigation measures to prevent escalation as appropriate for the phase of development).

The Overall Study Approach is Summarised as Follows

  • Develop assumptions;
  • Establish the assessment criteria;
  • Determine plausible hazardous risk scenarios and possible sources of leaks;
  • Launch the software, then determine the impact radius for flammable dispersion and unintentional ignition;
  • Report the outcomes for flammable dispersion and unintentional ignition.
  • Analyze the results against assessment criteria;
  • Provide the findings for every leak source together with the corresponding plausible scenarios;
  • Analyze the results against assessment criteria;
  • Conclude if the identified impact is acceptable and if the case recommend additional mitigation's.
Hazard Identification
A flowchart illustrating the process of determining potential outcomes for various release scenarios, focusing on different types of releases, phases, and ignition possibilities. The chart begins by assessing if there is a constant release rate, then proceeds to evaluate whether the release is transient, steady-state, or subsea. It further categorizes the release as vapor or liquid, identifies the formation of a jet or pool, and examines ignition conditions. Outcomes include unignited pool, jet fire, dispersion of cloud, cloud fire, explosion, pool fire, compartment fire, and subsea release. The chart suggests contacting FRED Help for further assistance

Project Summary

Elixir Engineering was awarded the task of providing necessary Safety and Design Verification Plan for Thamoud West and Maurid NE fields to meet forecasted production demands.

  • The Maurid field, discovered in 1997, and the Thamoud field are part of the South Oman salt basin. Both fields, currently under waterflooding, produce from the Ghariff and Al Khlata formations.
  • Elixir Engineering's project involves optimizing infrastructure to support the ongoing development of these oil fields and enhance production sustainability.

The Scope of Project

  • MSVs (Main Surface Valves) with corrosion-resistant HDPE liner/rotoliner
  • Coriolis Meter and Water Cut (WC) Meter (Red Eye) for well testing
  • 300# rating for well testing with static mixer and prover provision
  • Common setup for Mobile Well Testing (PI Unit)
  • Future provision for static mixer and WC meter installation
  • Concrete closed Relief/Maintenance Pit with Level Transmitter
  • Partial Relief Valves (RVs) (1 Working + 1 Standby)
  • Demulsifier skid with storage tank and RTU for control
  • Full flow RV on the test header.
  • Safety Studies
    • HAC Schedule
    • HAC Layout
    • Escape Route Layout
    • FGDEA
    • Safety Sign Layout
    • HSE ACR
    • Safety Critical Element Identification (SCE) Report
    • HFE Verification Report

Hazardous Area Classification (HAC)

What is Hazardous Area Classification HAC? - Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) is a method used to evaluate and designate parts of a facility based on the presence of flammable substances. The primary aim is to determine which areas are at risk for incidents like fires or explosions.

  • The process of dividing a facility into hazardous and non-hazardous sections and then further subdividing the hazardous parts into zones is known as area classification.
  • A three-dimensional place that requires extra care in equipment design and construction as well as in controlling other potential ignition sources is known as a hazardous area classification (HAC).
  • This is because flammable atmospheres are expected to be present there at certain frequencies
  • Zone Classification: Zones are created inside hazardous locations according to the probability and length of a flammable atmosphere.
    • Zone 0: The area of a dangerous area when there is a constant or prolonged presence of combustible air.
    • Zone 1: The portion of a dangerous location where the likelihood of a flammable environment during regular operations is high.
    • Zone 2: The portion of a hazardous location where there is little chance of a flammable environment during regular operations and, in the event that it does, it will only last briefly. Non-hazardous areas : Areas that do not fall into any of the above.
  • Source and grade of release: Any location from which a flammable gas, vapour, or liquid may be released into the atmosphere is considered a source of release for the purposes of area categorization. The expected frequency and duration of three grades of release are defined.
  • Continuous grade release: A release that happens often and at brief intervals, is virtually continuous, or is both. Primary grade release: A release that is planned for in operating procedures, meaning it is one that is expected to happen on a regular or infrequent basis during normal operation.
  • Release classified as secondary grade: One that, in any case, will only happen seldom and for brief periods of time and is unlikely to happen during regular operations

Fluid Categories:

FluidDescription
AA combustible liquid that would quickly and significantly evaporate upon discharge,
This category includes:
(a) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammable liquid.
(b) Any combustible liquid that has reached a temperature high enough to yield more than 40% volume vaporisation upon release and no external heat input. 
BA flammable liquid that does not fall under category A yet is hot enough to boil when released.
CAn ignitable liquid that does not fall under category A or B but that, upon release, may reach a temperature higher than its flash point or condense into a flammable mist or spray.
G(i)A typical methane-rich natural gas.
G(ii)A typical methane-rich natural gas.
Fluid Categories

Fire & Gas Dispersion Explosion Assessment (FGDEA)

  • By identifying and assessing potential fire and explosion hazards, the FGDEA seeks to ensure that the facility layout minimizes the probability of escalation to the greatest extent that is practically practicable.
  • According to PDO SP-1258 (Quantitative Risk Assessment Specification), physical effects modeling (PEM) is used to assess the impact of credible leaks and ascertain the likelihood of escalation.
  • According to the probable sources of leakage (PSLs), the study assesses the physical effects of hydrocarbon emissions as well as the possibility of harm to workers from flammable and hazardous releases.
  • As far as is practical, the physical effects modeling completed as part of the FGDEA will be used to optimize the Dhiab Infill Development Project, mitigate escalation, and create an intrinsically safe plot based on PDO SP-1127 & SP-1190.
  • It will also be used to confirm that the current Maintenance drain pit vent pipe layout is appropriate in accordance with DEP 80.45.10.10-Gen requirements
  • The Aim of this study is to
    • Determine all plausible hydrocarbon hazardous events (e.g., jet fire, flash fire, pool fire, flammable gas dispersion, and explosion);
    • Evaluate the effects of the final results resulting from releases;
    • Evaluate the toxic impacts in accordance with the requirements in SP-1190;
    • Evaluate the potential impact on adjacent units as well as buildings (if included in the project scope), taking into account the location of the potential releases;
    • Give a warning about the possibility of an explosion and fire escalation.
    • Determine protection / mitigation measures to prevent escalation as appropriate for the phase of development).
  • The study's approach is outlined as follows
    • Develop assumptions;
    • Establish the assessment criteria;
    • Determine plausible risk scenarios and possible sources of leaks;
    • Launch the software, then determine the impact radius for flammable dispersion and unintentional ignition;
    • Report the outcomes for flammable dispersion and unintentional ignition.
    • Analyse the results against assessment criteria;
    • Provide the findings for every leak source together with the corresponding plausible scenarios;
    • Analyse the results against assessment criteria;
    • Conclude if the identified impact is acceptable and if the case recommend additional mitigation.
Hazard Identification

Safety Critical Element Identification Report (SCE)

Any piece of hardware, structure, system, or logic software whose malfunction could result in a Major Accident Hazard (MAH) or whose goal is to stop, limit, or lessen the impacts of an MAH is referred to as a Safety Critical Element (SCE).

  • The identification of the Safety Critical Element (SCE) represents a critical step in project development that aims at minimizing the Major Accidental Hazards (MAHs) occurrence
  • This activity has to be performed from the beginning of the project and updated coherently with the developments throughout the life cycle of the project.
  • The aim of the present document is to provide the methodology used for the identification of SCE and eventually brief up the identified SCEs for the project.
  • In order to identify the SCE, the basic principle followed is as given below:
    • Identification of Major Accident Hazards (MAH);
    • Identification of the SCE groups as per the standards; and
    • Summarizing the identified SCEs for the current scope.
  • Hardware Barrier and SCE Groups
    • The role of a preventive / mitigation barrier is to prevent threat and limit consequences of MAH.
    • The purpose of this section is to ensure that all hardware barrier which are necessary to control MAH, are identified and the relevant SCEs are tabulated along with the tag No.
  • Hardware Barrier - High level grouping of SCEs utilized for reporting reasons is one of the hardware obstacles for MAH. There are 8 types of hardware barriers as depicted in the “Swiss Cheese Model”, shown the following figure - 2: Hardware Barrier and SCE Groups, which represents the two sides of bow-ties.
    • Structural Integrity (SI).
    • Process Containment (PC).
    • Ignition Control (IC).
    • Detection Systems (DS).
    • Protection System (PS).
    • Shutdown system (SD).
    • Emergency response (ER).
    • Life saving equipment (LS).
  • The hardware barriers are depicted with a number of small holes that represent a design flaw or some potential degradation of their performance.
  • On their own, these degradations may not be significant but, if the holes line up, there may be no effective barriers in place between safe operations and escalating consequences, leading to MAH.

SCE Groups - Hardware barriers are separated into SCE Groups for the purpose of management and reporting. The role these Groups play in maintaining the barrier's integrity defines them.

The image depicts a Swiss Cheese Model representation of safety barriers and Safety Critical Element (SCE) groups involved in maintaining safe operations within a hazardous environment. It highlights various layers of protection, each representing a different function, including Structural Integrity, Process Containment, Ignition Control, Detection Systems, Protection Systems, Shutdown Systems, and Emergency Response. Each barrier has potential vulnerabilities (illustrated by holes), and the escalation of threats is shown through these layers. The SCE groups, aligned with these barriers, are responsible for managing specific elements within the safety framework

SCE Selections - In general, the process of selection of SCEs start with a review of the generic list of SCEs as per the standards. SCEs selection process as represented below.

The image is a flowchart that outlines a process for identifying and categorizing Safety Critical Elements (SCE) in projects involving Major Accident Hazards (MAH). It begins with a Hazard Identification (HAZID) step and evaluates whether the project’s equipment or elements belong to specific SCE groups based on existing standards and safety cases (PR-1992/SR.14.112697 and SP-2062). If an MAH is identified, the process moves toward constructing a Bow-Tie model and identifying hardware barriers. The flowchart also includes a set of questions to determine whether failure in the element could lead to a major accident, helping to classify the element as Safety Critical [A], Business Critical [B], or Non-Critical [C]. The final steps focus on developing performance standards and completing necessary registration and assurance activities before the project is approved.

HFE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PLAN:

  • HFE Design Verification (Define phase) - Design shall be reviewed to verify that it complies with the project HFE Design Verification HFE standards as defined in the project technical standards selection list and any HFE requirements identified through HFE studies conducted in the combined DEFINE and EXECUTE phases have been satisfied.
  • HFE Construction Verification (Execute phase) - Ensure that HFE requirements have implemented at site during construction phase as per recommendations from design verification, if any.
  • The verification review shall be done by the project HFE Authorized person and appropriate disciplines wherever applicable in line with SP-2215-1 Human Factors Engineering in projects – General Requirements.
  • HFE Process - HFE shall be initiated in the assess phase of projects, Figure 4 gives an overview of the HFE Activities in each of the ASSESS, SELECT, DEFINE and EXECUTIVE phase of the project life cycles.
The image illustrates a process flow divided into three stages, each focusing on Human Factors Engineering (HFE) activities across different project phases. The first stage, "Select / BfD" (Basis for Design), involves HFE Screening Assessment and Strategy. The second stage, "Define / feed + DD" (Design Development), includes the completion of an HFE Studies Report, HFE Design Verification, and the creation of a Close-Out Plan for execution. The third and final stage, also labeled "Define / feed + DD," involves completing the HFE Studies Report, verifying HFE design, preparing an HFE plan for construction, conducting HFE verification in Operations Readiness (OR) and Pre-Start Up Audit (PSUAS), and concluding with an HFE Close-Out Report.

Conclusion

Elixir Engineering's commitment to enhancing safety and optimizing production at the Thamoud Infill Development Phase 3 Project aligns with industry standards and best practices. With a focus on all the safety studies, the project is designed to ensure operational efficiency and safety.

To learn more about how Elixir Engineering can assist with your infrastructure and safety verification needs, contact us today for a consultation or project inquiry. Let's work together to achieve sustainable and secure solutions.

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Project Summary

  • Elixir Engineering  was awarded to perform Brownfield Modification for Depletion Compression at MGP to ensure safety and optimise production
  • The Bukha Alpha platform is located roughly 23 kilometers from the Musandam Gas Plant (MGP), and the Bukha Field is located in Block 8 about 23 km offshore from the western coast of the Musandam Peninsula.
  • The Bukha and West Bukha oilfield are located in Offshore Block 8, which produced 4,458 barrels of oil equivalent per day on average in 2018.
  • As of January 2019, MOGC (Musandam Oil and Gas Company), which is wholly owned by MOGC (OQ E&P LLC), is in charge of operating Block 8.
  • The Musandam Gas Plant ("MGP"), an onshore processing plant, handles all of the production from Block 8. Whereas downstream gas processing units need an optimum operating pressure.
  • The MGP's inlet arrival operating pressure is in optimum condition.
  • The three inlet compressors located downstream of the slug-catcher are utilized to increase the pressure to the required pressure.
  • It is necessary to maintain the compressor setup such that one compressor is kept in standby mode.
Flowchart illustrating the process flow from West Bukha (WB) to Bukha Alpha (BA), leading to the MGP Inlet Receiving Facilities. The diagram then shows gas being processed at the MGP Gas Processing facility, with existing compressors arranged in a 3 x 50% parallel configuration. The flowchart outlines the key stages involved in the gas handling and processing system.
  • Presently, in order to achieve the required inlet pressure at MGP, the wells at Bukha and West Bukha are being operated at nominal pressure.
  • Production wells are in depletion mode, generating primarily gas and a lesser amount of water and condensate.
  • It is suggested that the MGP plant intake be operated at a lower pressure rate in order to improve production there.
  • As part of the conceptual study, various configurations of inlet gas compressor arrangements were examined in order to support the aforementioned proposal, and option 3A configuration was determined to be a workable choice.
  • In order to combine the project scope with the current plant for the reduced operating pressure at the slug
  • Production wells are in depletion mode, generating primarily gas and a lesser amount of water and condensate.
  • It is suggested that the MGP plant intake be operated at a lower pressure rate in order to improve production there.
  • As part of the conceptual study, various configurations of inlet gas compressor arrangements were examined in order to support the aforementioned proposal, and option 3A configuration was determined to be a workable choice.
  • In order to combine the project scope with the current plant for the reduced operating pressure at the slug catcher inlet, the following change will be necessary.
  • After the particle filter/coalescer, new piping must be tied in downstream to route the gas to the new LP compressor suction via an LP suction scrubber.
  • In order to meet the current gas compressor inlet parameters, gas pressure must be increased at the LP compressor inlet. To fulfill the project's requirements, the current inlet gas compressor arrangement must be modified to (1W+2S).
  • In accordance with current circumstances, gas pressure has been increased to satisfy the GSU battery limit requirement.
  • After the slug catcher condensate common line, a new tie-in must be created to integrate the new condensate booster pump.
  • Condensate operating pressure has been raised to match the existing operating pressure at downstream.
  • Produced water from the slug catcher is re-routed to the existing skim system instead of connecting downstream due to the low operating pressure of slug catcher.
  • A new tie-in shall be made to provide fuel gas blanketing for MP production separator with the required operating pressure due to limitation of fuel gas supply pressure at downstream & constant supply to the pre-flash vessel in order to keep the necessary operational pressure.
  • The EPC scope of work includes the Engineering, Procurement, Manufacture, Fabrication, Logistics, Supply, Construction, Installation, Erection, Managing Interfaces, Interconnection, Supervision, Training< Pre-commissioning, Commissioning, Start-up, Testing and completion of the facilities; performing warranty and remedial work concerning the facilities, the provision of spares, and the provision of As built, Asset registration all document required for final acceptance of the work and project hand over including arrangement of temporary facilities.

The following actions are part of the work, but they are not the only ones:

  • FEED verification and to provide the FEED verification confirmation that FEED is accepted, during the bidding stage
  • Data collection, site survey, further develop the FEED deliverables during Detailed Design and detailed design from FEED package including all required design, safety studies, and reviews
  • All materials procurement including long lead items
  • Construction, and equipment installation as per AFC drawings
  • Pre-Commissioning, Commissioning, Start-Up, performance test
  • Submission of all Redline markup and As-built drawings / Documents, SAP/asset registration, and all documentation required for final acceptance of the work and project handover.
  • Temporary facilities (offices, Accommodation, Camp Facilities, Laydown Area, Workshop, Storage yard, and reinstate post project completion).
  • Compliance, Implementation and obtain necessary approvals for any of Government authorities, regulations and requirements.
  • Compliance and Implementation of all COMPANY HSSE, QA/QC policies, procedures, guidelines, technical Specifications, and standards

Following major equipment/modification anticipated:

  • 1W+1S – New LP stage compressor package with associated packages and accessories
  • Modification / tie-in with existing compressors
  • LP Compressor after cooler per LP compressor
  • Condensate Booster Pumps
  • LP Inlet Scrubbers
  • Control and ESD valves
  • Control system Upgradation
  • Adequacy verification of existing facilities
  • Fire water network with fire fighting equipment
  • Utilities extension
  • Early tie-in, Hot tap tie-ins, Electrical & utility tie-ins
  • Installation new equipment piping , electrical, instruments, tele-communication, CCTV, civil supports, earth works, fence, HVAC(if required), Electrical, and instrumentations as per approved construction documents.
  • The scope also includes modification of existing facilities and reinstate the existing facility.

In context to the above scope of work, Elixir Engineering has done below listed safety studies for the Brownfield modification project for Onshore Depletion- Compression at MGP.

Safety Studies

  • EERA
  • F&G Mapping
  • FERA
  • PEM

Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)

  • In the event of a major incident, facility design must ensure that any resulting risks to personnel are assessed and reduced to a level considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
  • This can be achieved through the availability of appropriate Escape, Evacuation, and Rescue (EER) provisions, alongside the implementation of effective emergency response procedures and training.
  • Every facility should have an Emergency, Escape, and Rescue (EER) plan aimed at ensuring the safety of personnel during emergencies.
  • While the following guidelines are focused on offshore facilities, which are typically very congested, they are equally useful for creating an ideal plan for onshore operations:
    • Ensure personnel can safely leave their work area in the event of an incident.
    • Provide a secure area or temporary refuge where personnel can gather until the situation is brought under control. This safe area must be protected from hazards such as smoke, gas ingress (flammable or toxic), oxygen deficiency, CO2 buildup, and extreme heat.
    • Ensure reliable communication systems are in place so personnel can coordinate with emergency response teams.
    • Facilitate the full evacuation of the facility if required.
Escape, Evacuation & Mustering Process:

The image is a flowchart illustrating the Escape, Evacuation, and Mustering Process during an emergency. It begins with Detection of a hazard, followed by the triggering of an Alarm to alert personnel. The next step involves Escape, where individuals move to a safe location. Once safe, personnel Assemble in the muster area or assembly point, where a Roll call is conducted, and search and rescue operations are initiated for any missing individuals. If no safe haven is available at the facility, Evacuation is carried out. The process concludes with the Rescue of personnel from danger.
Escape, Evacuation & Mustering Functional Requirements

The Escape, Evacuation, Mustering and Rescue facilities include the following

  1. Alarm and Communication system
  2. Escape Routes
  3. Muster Area / Assembly point
  4. Rescue facilities
  5. Emergency Training

Escape, Evacuation & Mustering Study Methodology

  • The EER (Escape, Evacuation, and Rescue) approach addresses multiple potential Major Accident Hazard (MAH) scenarios that may require EER systems.
  • MAH scenarios are assessed for their potential to impair the escape, evacuation, and rescue systems.
  • The study involves evaluating the EER systems based on egress, escape, evacuation, and rescue goals as well as impairment criteria.A detailed review of each process area is conducted to assess whether escape routes and muster locations can be impacted by MAHs.
  • The purpose of this review is to determine if the existing EER facilities are adequate or if additional systems are required.
  • The study estimates the time required to escape and muster to designated areas.
  • This estimated time is used to establish the minimum endurance criterion for maintaining the integrity of muster areas.
  • The availability and effectiveness of the EER arrangement are assessed under various MAH scenarios to ensure safety and reliability.

The following Methodology will be followed for the EERA study

  1. MAH Scenario Identification: Identify the MAH scenarios, using the FERA study;
  2. EER Goals: Identify the EER goals, for which the EER facilities will be assessed against;
  3. EER Criteria: Indicate the EER criteria to be used to assess whether the EER goals are met;
  4. EER Facilities: Describe the EER facilities at MGP;
  5. Detection and Alarm Review: A review of the effectiveness of the Detection and Alarm system for this project in providing adequate warning of an impending MAH scenario will be made. Estimation of time to alarm and its audibility to onsite personnel, make work safe, escape and muster will be provided;
  6. EER Impairment Assessment: Assess the impairment of the EER facilities against the EER Criteria, in order to check whether the EER Goals are met;
  7. If EER Goals are not met, adequate recommendations are provided;

MAH Scenario Identification

The development of Major Accidents from consideration of the Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) present at the facility must be clearly identified.

Fire and Gas Mapping Study (F&G)

The objective of F&G Mapping study is to ensure F&G detectors are distributed in line with the F&G philosophy of project based on Fire & Gas Detector Layout, Identify any gaps and to make recommendations where required on the number and placement of various detectors.

Fire & Gas detection

  • Prompt detection of gas release or a fire at its earliest stage of development is a crucial factor for a fire protection system to be effective, with a rapid response minimizing the potential for the event to escalate.
  • A good fire & gas detection system gives detection provisions aligned with the hazards presented across the facility, providing a response that minimizes the impact of releases to personnel, assets, and the environment.
  • Detection can take place by personnel or by safeguarding instruments, with instrument detection systems that includes the following:
    • The ability to detect gas leakage through gas detection
    • Fire detection, which provides a warning to flame/heat generated by a fire (e.g. flame detection, /heat detection).
  • The nature of the response is typically defined in the facility’s Fire & Gas philosophy, that depends on the risks associated with the facility, the detection systems can be used to either provide an alarm requiring personnel action and/or to initiate executive actions, such as plant isolation automatically.

F&G Methodology:

  • Step 1: Hazardous Area Identification - The Musandam Gas Plant (MGP) will be critically assessed for identifying all hazard (fire and gas (flammable & toxic) hazards) areas that are present will be segregated into different hazardous detection areas /Mapping areas.
  • Step 2: Hazardous Area Characterisation - From the above identification, major accident hazards will be characterized based on the likelihood and frequency of the incident related to the properties of the fluid and quantity of the fluid released.
  • Step 3: Risk Volume Definition - The Risk Volume will be defined for the identified hazardous area in line with company/International standards/Good Engineering Practices.
  • Step 4: Identifying the distinctive cloud for detection - The Risk Volume will be assessed and the cloud size for detection will be identified in line with company/International standards.
  • Step 5: Detect 3D Modelling - The 3D Geometry file will be imported to the software and the Fire and Gas detectors will be placed based on preliminary F&G Layout at the hazardous zone.
  • Step 6: Coverage Mapping - The newly installed detectors in the layout will be evaluated in accordance with the performance target to determine whether or not they are positioned appropriately to sense and identify any potential fires and gas dispersion at that site.
  • Step 7: Optimization/Detector Layout Definition - For each loss of containment scenario, use the same procedures as above. If the detectors are discovered to be insufficient to sense or detect the dispersion, adjust the height of the detector or move its placement to better align with the hydrocarbon release's dispersion coverage.
Flowchart outlining the 3D modeling and detector placement methodology in hazardous area identification. It includes steps such as hazardous area identification, characterization, risk volume definition, and determining characteristic clouds for detection. It also details the process for 3D modeling and placement of detectors, checking coverage results, and optimizing the detector layout if the target is not met or largely exceeded. The process ends if coverage targets are met

Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA)

The key objectives of FERA study are as follows:

  • Identify the potential Fire and Explosion Hazard Sources;
  • Evaluate the potential fire;
  • Escalation to adjacent Fire Zones;
  • Active fire protection requirements;
  • Evaluate the potential Explosion Overpressure Impact on Critical Structure, Plant Buildings etc;
  • Passive Fire protection requirements;
  • Evaluate the toxic Gas Impact to the plant personnel;
  • Assess the plant building blast resilience requirements.
  • Location for Manual activate provision of Deluge system
  • Evaluate the impact from existing unit to other units.

FERA Methodology

  • A systematic and organized method for determining and evaluating the risks associated with fire and explosion threats is called Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment, or FERA.
  • To guarantee safe facility layouts, the assessment's findings are used as inputs to fire zone assessment, specify active and passive fire protection system requirements assessment, and provide inputs for escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA), Occupied Building Risk Assessment (OBRA), and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) studies.
  • FERA will assess the fire and explosion scenarios for Brownfield Modification Project for Onshore Depletion Compression at Musandam Gas Plant (MGP).

For the Brownfield Modification at MGP, the FERA shall involve the following major steps

  1. Development of FERA study assumptions.
  2. Identification of fire, explosion and flammable hazards i.e. jet fire, pool fire, flammable gas dispersion, BLEVE, VCE etc.
  3. Estimate hazard inventories based on isolatable sections, i.e. isolation valve to isolation valve (for normal operating conditions).
  4. Determination of failure probabilities based on the parts count method for each of the identified failure cases.
  5. Define locations and facilities for control and mitigation, i.e. isolation of systems using P&IDs, PFDs, Plot Plans and other relevant details, including all major equipment items.
  6. Identify Potential Explosion Sites (PES) based on the review of the plot plans, 3D models, PFDs, site visits that have the potential for gas accumulation, congestion and confinement within the plant/facilities and nearby areas. For each of the PES determine the blast potential.
  7. Identify receptors to be evaluated as a part of FERA study, such as critical structures, buildings etc.
  8. Using the predefined release size, consequence modelling will be performed using COMPANY approved software package for the identified fire, and explosion hazards
  9. Determine event probabilities for each of the failure cases (i.e. directional probabilities, wind profile, failure probabilities, ignition probabilities etc.)
  10. Review the impact of fire and explosion events on the facility, and in particular:
    • Assess the escalation potential;
    • Assess the impact on occupied buildings/ and buildings containing critical equipment;
    • Assess the impact on HSE critical equipment and systems, key structures, EER measures and supporting structures;
    • Review the existing protection measures in place based on the above review and identify recommendations, if any, to reduce the impact from fire and explosion.
  11. For each of the identified receptors, based on the event probabilities, fire and explosion assessment, determine the exceedance curve and contours based on the impairment frequency and vulnerability criteria.
  12. Carryout fire zone assessment to determine fire zone for new plant area.
  13. Review of active and passive fire protection based on the defined fire zone.
  14. Providing Conclusion and recommendations
Flowchart illustrating the Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment FERA process. The process begins with the FERA Methodology and Assumption Register and flows through multiple stages such as Fire & Explosion Hazards Identification, Selection of Failure Case Scenarios, Frequency Assessment Process, Physical Parameters Selection, Consequence Assessment, and Risk Evaluation. Further steps include defining Potential Explosion Sites PES, Volume Blockage Ratio VBR and Blast Strength Curve identification, Fire Protection Systems Adequacy Checks, and culminates with a FERA Workshop leading to the Conclusion and Recommendations.

Physical Effect Modelling (PEM)

The key objectives of PEM study are as follows

  • Identify The Potential Fire and Explosion Hazard Sources;
  • Evaluate the Potential Fire;
  • Escalation to Adjacent Fire Zones;
  • Evaluate the Potential Explosion Over pressure Impact on Critical Structure, Plant Buildings etc;
  • Evaluate The Toxic Gas Impact to The Plant Personnel;
  • Assess the Plant Building Blast Resilience Requirements.
  • Evaluate the impact on Muster points.

PEM Methodology

Physical effect modelling (PEM) is a structured and systematic process to identify and assess the impacts from fire and explosion hazards. The evaluation's findings are applied to guarantee secure facility designs.

  1. Hazard identification: Most hazardous events involve loss of containment from process equipment. Potential hazardous outcomes. For identifying hazardous inventories, the assessment was done considering pressure, temperature and composition reported from the respective equipment.
  2. Consequence analysis: The consequence modelling for loss of containment was done using Pressure vessel modelling software. The same model can be used to determine the flammable & toxic dispersion and thermal radiation.
  3. Layout Spacing: The minimum separation distance to prevent escalation between equipment is based on the distance to the 37.5 kW/m2 contour from jet fire arising from a 22 mm hole size and LFL flammable gas concentration between equipment handling hydrocarbon and ignition source. The required fence distance was also analysed based on the toxic and thermal radiation criteria.
  4. Review the impact of fire and explosion events subjective to the facility
  5. Providing Conclusion and recommendations

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Brownfield Modification Project at Musandam Gas Plant (MGP) demonstrates Elixir Engineering's expertise in optimizing onshore depletion compression systems. This project not only improves gas production efficiency but also ensures the plant operates at peak performance while meeting industry safety standards.

If you're looking to enhance your facility's operational efficiency and reliability, contact Elixir Engineering today. Our team is ready to provide customized solutions for your brownfield and greenfield projects. Get in touch with us now to discuss how we can support your next project.

Elixir Engineering  was awarded to perform Safety Integration and Valve Criticality Analysis for Dhiab Infill Development Project

Project Summary

Dhiab Field is located 35km SW of the Marmul Field, onshore Oman in the South Oman Salt Basin. The field was discovered in 1985 and first oil was produced to surface in 1987. Dhiab structure is essentially a four-way-dip anticline, complicated by significant faulting.

The field is currently produced under water flooding, a mini water flooding experiment started in 2012 to test the response to flank water injection as a mean to increase field recovery, given the overall absence of strong aquifers to support pressure. The 2016 FDP suggested WF 5-spot development as the development mechanism which is implemented in the field since 2017. The main producing intervals in Dhiab are Middle Gharif, Lower Gharif and Al Khlata Formations, with total STOIIP of 16 million Sm3 as per 2016 FDP.

2016 saw the delivery of Dhiab's most recent FDP. Phase II development was covered. The development has a total of 48 2PUD wells. Inverted "9-spot" patterns, which are part of the CR project, and inverted 5-spot patterns with 250 m spacing for 2PUD.

As per June 2021 the cumulative oil production is ~ 1.44 MMm3, with expected developed and undeveloped reserves of ~ 0.54 MMm3 and ~ 0.57 MMm3 respectively. The total STOIIP expected was estimated at ~ 16.96 MMm3, yielding an expected recovery factor of 21% (currently around ~ 15%). The major items covered under this project scope are listed below, Project scope will be executed in 2 phases

Phase 1

  • 3 nos. of 3”x6” MSV, 300# (MSVs will be free issued by PDO).
  • 3 nos. of Coriolis Meters, 3 nos. of Water Cut Meters & 3 nos. of DLQs for Well Testing with one common Provision for Mobile PI Unit.
  • 12” Common header for all the MSVs. Tie-in provision with DBB to be considered for installation of future MSVs (tentatively 3 nos.)
  • 12" CS/PE, 300# 200 m, A/G Jump-Over Pipeline between New and Old Pipeline.
  • 1 No. of Demulsifier Injection Skid at the New MSV facility up-stream of the jump-over line.
  • 1 No. of Full flow RV (1×100%), 1”D2’ at the common Test header.
  • Re-routing of the existing access graded road (500 meters)

Phase 2

  • 14” CS/PE 300#, 20 km, A/G pipeline from Dhiab to Rahab manifold.
  • 1 no. of Bulk Flow Meter (Coriolis Meter) for the gross flow measurement at Rahab end of the new proposed pipeline.
  • Tie-in Provision for Rahab SW on the new loop line along with DBB arrangement.

Elixir Engineering has done the listed safety studies for Dhiab Infill project.

Safety Studies

  • HAC Schedule
  • HAC Layout
  • Escape Route Layout
  • FGDEA
  • Safety Equipment
  • HSE ACR
  • HFE VCA
  • HFE Verification Report
  • HSE Activity Plan
  • HFE close out report
Hazardous Area Classification (HAC)

The process of Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) involves determining which elements of a facility are dangerous and which are not, as well as creating zones for the hazardous areas. A hazardous region is described as a three-dimensional place where it is reasonable to assume that a flammable atmosphere will exist at frequencies that necessitate particular safety measures for equipment design and construction as well as the management of other possible ignition sources.

 Zone Classification: Zones are created in hazardous regions according to the probability and length of a flammable atmosphere.  

  • Zone 0 : That portion of a dangerous location where combustible air is persistent or prevalent for extended periods of time.
  • Zone 1 : The portion of a dangerous area where, under normal circumstances, flammable atmospheres are likely to occur
  •  Zone 2 : That portion of a dangerous region where the likelihood of a flammable environment occurring during regular operations is low and, in the event that it does, it will only last briefly.

Non-hazardous areas : Areas that do not occupy any of the above.

Source & Grade of release: Any region from which a flammable gas, vapour, or liquid may be discharged into the atmosphere is considered as a source of discharge for the purpose of area segregation. Based on their expected frequency and duration Three release grades are recognised.

  • Continuous grade release : A discharge that happens frequently and at brief intervals, or that is constant or almost continuous.
  • Primary grade release : A release that is probable to happen periodically or occasionally in normal operation i.e. a release that is planned for in operating procedures.
  • Secondary grade release : A release that is unlikely to happen during regular operations and, in any case, will only happen occasionally and briefly

Fluid Categories

FluidDescription
A A flammable liquid that would quickly and significantly evaporate upon release. This group consists of:
(a) Any lighter flammable liquid or any liquefied petroleum gas
(b) Any flammable liquid at a temperature high enough to cause more than 40% volume to evaporate upon release when released, with no additional heat input from the environment.
BA combustible liquid that isn't in category A yet is hot enough to boil when released
CA flammable liquid, not in categories A or B, but which can, on release, be at temperature above its flash point, or form a flammable mist or spray.
G(i)A typical methane-rich natural gas.
G(ii)Refinery hydrogen.
Fire & Gas Dispersion Explosion Assessment (FGDEA)

The goal of the FGDEA is to guarantee that the facility layout minimizes the possibility of escalation to the greatest extent that is practically practicable by identifying and evaluating plausible fire and explosion dangers. To evaluate the impact of believable leaks and determine the possibility of escalation, physical effects modeling (PEM) is used in accordance with PDO SP-1258 (Quantitative Risk Assessment Specification). The study evaluates the potential for impact on workers from hazardous and flammable releases as well as the physical impacts of hydrocarbon emissions, as specified by the potential sources of leakage (PSLs). The physical effects modelling carried out as part of the FGDEA will be used to optimize the Dhiab Infill Development Project and to mitigate escalation and achieve an inherently safe plot, as far as practicable, based on PDO SP-1127 & SP-1190 and confirm the suitability of the current layout of the Maintenance drain pit vent pipe based on the requirements in DEP 80.45.10.10-Gen.

The objectives of this study is as follows:

  • Identify hazardous inventories handled and processed in the proposed facilities and their operating conditions;
  • Identify all credible hydrocarbon hazardous events (i.e. Jet fire, flash fire, pool fire, flammable gas dispersion, as well as explosion);
  • Assess the consequences of the final outcomes resulting from releases;
  • Assess the toxic impacts with respect to the requirements in SP-1190;
  • Assess the potential impact on adjacent units as well as buildings (if included in project scope), taking into account the location of the potential releases;
  • Provide an indication of potential escalation from the fire and explosion consequences
  • Identify protection / mitigation measures to prevent escalation as appropriate for the phase of development.

The overall study approach is summarised as follows:

  • Develop assumptions;
  • Establish the assessment criteria;
  • Identify potential leak sources and credible hazardous scenarios;
  • Run the Software and calculate the impact radius for accidental ignition and flammable dispersion;
  • Report the results for accidental ignition and flammable dispersion;
  • Analyse the results against assessment criteria;
  • Report the results for each source of leak and respective credible scenarios;
  • Analyse the results against assessment criteria;
  • Conclude if the identified impact is acceptable and if the case recommend additional mitigation's.

Hazard Identification

Event Tree for Process Hazards
Valve Criticality Analysis (VCA)

HFE-VCA's goal is to outline the requirements for applying HFE concepts to valve design and layout, which includes the following:

  • Analyse and then classify the criticality of valves for a specific application.
  • Advice on choosing the right kind of actuator or valve operator.
  • HFE design specifications for valve placement and orientation.

Valve Criticality Rating

General

Valves are rated by criticality to help ensure that criticality valves are located to provide for rapid and effective identification and operation. The following three categories are recommended. Risk to health and safety—including the possibility of human error—must be maintained to a minimum.

Category-1 (C-1) Critical Valves

Included in the category of valves are those necessary for regular or emergency operations where quick and unhindered access is crucial. The next sections' descriptions of the "preferred" site must be followed in terms of height, reach distances, and visibility.

These valves satisfy any or all of the subsequent requirements:

  1. Valves essential to production.
  2. Valves essential to process safety or asset integrity
  3. Particularly large valves
  4. MOVs that need quick correction and have a high failure rate.
  5. Valves utilized in a service or in operational circumstances where their failure rates are unknown or potentially unstable
  6. Valves where consequence of failure to obtain quick access would be serious (e.g, process shutdown and/or damage to facilities or personnel).
  7. Valves for which more regular routine maintenance, inspections, and/or operations are anticipated than once every six months.

Access Requirement for C-1 Valves

A permanent raised standing platform must be made available for accessibility. If steps are the only feasible means of access to the elevated platform, then access at ground or deck level is permissible.
The identification and state of valves must be easily observable from an approachable operator position, such as on a nearby walkway, access platform, or in the area surrounding equipment meant for human use.

Category-2 (C-2) Non-Critical Valves

Valves are employed in routine maintenance and inspection procedures, but they are not essential for regular or emergency operations. These valves satisfy any or all of the subsequent requirements:

  1. Valves linked with equipment for which urgent intervention is unlikely to be needed.
  2. Valves with a low operating or inspection frequency (i.e., less than once every 6 months).

Access Requirement for C-2 Valves

The "preferred" location, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, for C-2 valves should be the same as for C-1 valves in terms of height, reach, and visibility. C-2 valves may be located within the “acceptable area” as outlined in Figure 3, depending on their size and the force needed to operate them. A vertical fixed ladder and a small standing surface must be provided for access to C-2 valves in cases where ground level access is not justified.If adequate room and access are maintained for workers, tools, components, and equipment in the design, using auxiliary equipment (such as scaffolding, man lifts, or mobile platforms) to obtain access for maintenance reasons may be permitted.The operator may need to temporarily assume an awkward posture or reach areas not meant for human access in order to identify and inspect the state of C-2 valves, as long as doing so does not result in human error or place the operator in danger of harm or exposure to hazards.

Category‐3 (C-3) Non-operational Valves

Typically, valves are non-operating devices that are employed or examined in specific situations only seldom or infrequently (such as hot tap valves, hydro static test vents, high point vents, or low point drain valves situated in pipe racks), and they are not utilized in activities that are crucial to the HSSE.

Access Requirement for C-3 Valves

Although not necessary, constant access to and visibility of C-3 valves is preferred. No specific location requirements are imposed. Auxiliary equipment like as mobile platforms, human lifts, and/or scaffolding that are used to access C-3 valves must be specified and permitted in the design. C-3 valves should not be accessed with portable ladders. Any suggested exemption or exceptions to this will require careful consideration and approval. Height and reach distances to C-3 valves when operated from auxiliary equipment shall confirm to the “preferred” location.

Mounting heights for hand-wheel operated valves with vertical stems
Mounting heights and clearances distances for hand wheel operated valves with vertical stems

Notes

  • The hand-wheel centerline is used to measure heights and distances.For gear-operated valves with a hand- The maximum horizontal distance for gear-operated valves with a hand-wheel and a spinner handle is determined by measuring the hand-wheel's edge that is furthest away from the operator.
  • For rising stem valves, the heights must be at the maximum extent of the valve stem.
  • With the exception of reducing the top limit for the "Preferred" choice location by 100mm (4 in) to accommodate male and female populations in regions like West Africa, Southeast Asia, Southern China, parts of Latin America, India, and Japan, these dimensions are appropriate for male and female personnel worldwide, ranging from the fifth to the ninety-fifth percentile.
  • If the valve is less than 455 mm (18 in.), there should be enough space behind the operator, at least 910 mm (36 in. ), in order to facilitate sitting

Notes

  • Measuring is done using the hand-wheel centerline for height or distance. For gear-operated valves with a hand-wheel provided with a spinner handle, maximum horizontal distances is measured to the edge of the hand-wheel furthest from the operator.
  • For 5th percentile males, the upper limit should be set at 1755 mm (69 in), and for 5th percentile females, it should be set at 66 in (1675 mm) in regions like Southeast Asia, Southern China, West Africa, and parts of Latin America, India, and Japan. These dimensions are appropriate for personnel worldwide, ranging from the 5th percentile of the female population to the 95th percentile of the male population.
  • For valves located below 455mm (18in), sufficient clearance of at least 910 mm (36in) should be provided behind the operator to accommodate a squatting posture.
Mounting heights for lever operated valves with vertical stems
Mounting heights and clearances distances for lever operated valves with vertical stems
Mounting heights and clearances distances for lever operated valves with horizontal stems

Elixir Engineering conducted a HAZOP Study for Jotun Paints in Oman, addressing risks in design and operation for their manufacturing hub, ensuring safety and efficiency in the MEIA region

Project Summary

  • Jotun Paints awarded Elixir Engineering the task of conducting a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study Oman for Jotun Paints, focusing on their manufacturing hub in Oman.
  • The facility will cater to the Middle East, India, and Africa (MEIA) regions, with an initial production target of 1 million kg in the first year, ramping up to 2.5 million kg by the fourth year.
  • Ensuring a smooth transition from raw material arrangements to the final goods warehouse is part of the meticulous planning.
  • To meet the increasing demand, engineers designed the plant to handle a capacity of 2.7 million kg across two shifts. The facility includes:
    • Two floor-mounted dissolvers
    • Two pressing units
    • Two filling units
  • To prevent cross-contamination, dedicated pot mixers and dissolvers, We will use filling machines for both Component A and Component B.
    • To enhance ergonomics, the plant features:
      • A scissor table with adjustable height for charging powder raw material
      • An additive station
      • Power Pot Mover
      • A drum manipulator for stacking filled drums on pallets
  • For increased precision and quality, liquid raw materials will be added straight to the pot mixer via the PLC and Pit scale.Future expansion provisions include an additional floor-mounted dissolver.
  • After being weighed on a weighing pit scale, raw components such as Epoxy Resin 2540, Trimethylolpropane Triacrylate 11452, Aradur 3745# 11441, ROFLEX T70 11453, and Dimethylaminomethyl (Phenol) 11451 are combined with RM powders in a 4-shaft mixer.
  • The finished product is pressed in a hydraulic press and sent to the pail filler unit for subsequent packaging.

HAZOP Study Methodology

  • The process/utility system and related interfaces are the main emphasis of the HAZOP.
  • The fundamental idea of a HAZOP study is to take a detailed description of the process and question every aspect of it in brainstorming sessions attended by the various experts involved in the process design in order to first identify potential deviations from the intended design and identify potential causes and consequences for those deviations.
  • The following are the primary steps in a HAZOP Study
    • Select the node (Line, equipment or a system) on the P&ID.
    • List of the intention and process parameters, guidewords for the nodes.
    • List all deviations and ignore deviations that are not meaningful and apply the deviation.
    • Brainstorm and list various causes of the deviation and ignore causes that are not credible.
    • Determine the consequences of the deviations due to each listed credible cause.
    • Identify safeguards already provided in the system.
    • Suggest recommendations or actions should the safeguards be inadequate.
    • Repeat steps 3 to 7 for each deviation.
    • Repeat steps from one (1) to eight (8) on the next node until all the nodes are covered.
    The image is a flowchart illustrating the process of conducting a HAZOP Hazard and Operability HAZOP study flowchart detailing step-by-step analysis for identifying and mitigating risks in process design. The process starts with explaining the overall design, followed by selecting a node and agreeing on the design intent. Key elements and characteristics are identified, and guide words are applied to analyze deviations. Each deviation is checked for credibility. The study investigates the causes, consequences, protections, or indications of potential hazards. The process repeats for all elements until every part has been examined, concluding with the documentation of findings
    HAZOP METHODOLOGY

    Elements of HAZOP Study

    • Node Definition
      • The HAZOP investigation moves through the plant node by node. .
      • The facilitator defines the node size and route through the plant.
      • Each node is described with:
        • A brief description
        • Typical operating and design conditions
        • Maintenance, operation, and operator intervention procedures
    • Parameters
      • Primary factors include temperature, pressure, and flow.
      • Additional parameters related to maintenance, safety, corrosion/erosion, instrumentation, and start-up/shutdown are also considered.
    • Guidewords
      • Standard guidewords such as No/None, More/Less, As Well As/Part of, Reverse/Other Than, Early/Late, Before/After are applied to each parameter to suggest deviations.
    • Causes
      • All plausible causes of deviations are considered, focusing on local factors related to the node under study.
      • Unrelated simultaneous events are excluded.
    • Consequence
      • Global impacts are analyzed to determine the ultimate effect of each deviation.
    • Safeguards
      • Risk depends on both likelihood and outcome.
      • Safeguards that reduce either probability or consequence are identified, including engineering or administrative measures.
      • Existing and functional safeguards for the operating plant are verified.
    • Recommendations
      • Recommendations should be action-based (e.g., Check, Provide, Consider) and assigned to specific work groups.
      • They should clarify what, where, and why actions are needed.

    Deliverables:

    The primary deliverable is a Comprehensive HAZOP Report for the Oman facility.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, Elixir Engineering's HAZOP study for Jotun Paints’ Oman facility has effectively identified potential risks in the production process and provided recommendations to ensure safety, efficiency, and environmental compliance. By evaluating each stage, from raw materials to final product storage, Elixir Engineering has supported Jotun Paints in achieving a safe, optimized operational framework aligned with production goals. The study's insights contribute to ongoing improvements and set a foundation for scalable, sustainable manufacturing practices.

    Elixir Engineering was awarded to perform Fire, Gas Dispersion & Explosion Analysis (FGDEA) and Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) for the Wells in the Kauther Gas Lift Project. 

    Project Summary

    • KGP fields are rich retrograde condensate gas reservoirs.
    • There was a need to extend well life to reduce deferment and improve UR by improving well outflow and reducing OPEX and flaring associated with unloading restoration operations.
    • Gas lift combined with Velocity string VS was determined to be the best solution for kick-off and for continuous lifting purposes.
    • Accordingly, Rock International intended Elixir Engineering to perform Fire, Gas Dispersion & Explosion Analysis (FGDEA) and Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) for wells in the Kauther Gas Lift Project.

    What is HAC

    Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) is a method used to evaluate and categorize sections of a facility based on the presence and concentration of flammable substances. Its main purpose is to identify areas prone to fire or explosion risks and to ensure the selection of appropriate equipment and safe installation practices, thereby distinguishing these hazardous zones from non-hazardous ones.

    Hazardous Area Classification (HAC) Methodology

    • The evaluated separation of a facility into hazardous and non-hazardous regions, as well as the segmentation of the hazardous sections into zones, is known as area classification.
    • A hazardous area is characterized as a three-dimensional place where it is reasonable to assume the presence of a flammable atmosphere at frequencies that necessitate extra care in the design and construction of equipment as well as the management of other potential sources of ignition.
      • Zone Classification: Hazardous areas are divided into zones based on the likelihood of occurrence and duration of a flammable atmosphere.
      • Zone 0: That portion of a dangerous location where there is a constant or prolonged presence of combustible air.
      • Zone 1: The portion of a dangerous location where flammable air is most likely to occur during regular operations.  
      • Zone 2: That part of a hazardous area in which a flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs, will exist only for a short period.
    • Non-hazardous areas: Areas not covered by any of the aforementioned.
      • Grade and source of release: A source of release is any location from which a flammable gas, vapor, or liquid may be released into the atmosphere for the purposes of area classification. Based on their expected frequency and duration, three release grades are determined.
      • Continuous grade release: A release that happens regularly and at brief intervals, or that is almost continual.
      • Primary grade release: A release that is anticipated to happen in operational procedures that is likely to happen regularly or periodically throughout normal operation.
      • Secondary grade release: A release that is unlikely to happen during regular operations and, in any case, will only happen occasionally and briefly.

    Fluid Categories:

    FluidDescription
    AA combustible liquid that would quickly and significantly evaporate upon discharge. This category includes:
    a) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammable liquid.
    b) Any combustible liquid that, when released, vaporizes at a temperature high enough to create more than 40% of its volume without the addition of external heat.
    BA combustible liquid that isn't in category A yet is hot enough to boil when released.
    CA flammable liquid, not in categories A or B, but which can, on release, be at temperature above its flash point, or form a flammable mist or spray.
    G(i)A typical methane-rich natural gas.
    G(ii)Refinery hydrogen.

    Vent Dispersion Study

    What is Vent Dispersion Study

    A vent dispersion study assesses how gases or vapors released from a vent disperse into the atmosphere. This study helps determine safe distances and operational limits to prevent hazardous concentrations from reaching areas where they could pose health or explosion risks. By modeling the dispersion patterns, it ensures that released substances remain within safe, acceptable limits, safeguarding people, equipment, and the environment.

    • The objectives of the FGDEA are to carry out dispersion and thermal radiation assessment to ensure the distance from the wellhead/RMS manifold and the vent heights to the fence is adequate.
    • The following leak sources are considered for the modeling
      • Well head and RMS manifold
      • Drain Pit Vent
      • RV Vents

      Overview

      • The FGDEA is a structured and systematic study to identify and assess credible fire and explosion hazards and ensure the facility layout eliminates the potential for escalation as far as reasonably practicable.
      • This involves performing physical effects modeling (PEM) to assess the impact of credible leaks and assess the potential for escalation as per PDO SP-1258 (Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Specification).
      • The study quantifies the physical effects of hydrocarbon releases, as defined by the potential sources of leakage (PSLs), and assesses the potential for impact on personnel due to flammable releases.
      • The physical effects modeling carried out as part of the FGDEA will be used to optimize the safe distance as per project scope to mitigate escalation and achieve an inherently safe plot, as far as practicable, based on PDO SP-1127.
      • Steps
        • Vent modelling
          • Calculate the required fence distance and vent height to achieve the heat radiation criteria (5 Kw/m2 at the property fence) using the Gas Jet Flame Module.
          • For the vent height calculated in Step-1, carry out flammable gas and H2S dispersion analysis to ensure that the calculated height also meets the gas exposure limits at the facility fence to ensure that personnel working inside the fence are not exposed to flammable or toxic gas.
        • Leak Modelling
          • Obtain composition and flowrates from Process for the RMS and Wellhead for new wells
          • Carry out leak modeling for the 22mm.
          • Analyze flammable dispersion for 100% LFL to assess whether the required distance to the fence is safe from the source of leak.

        Deliverables:

        Hazardous Area Classification Report compiled with zone maps, documentation of Hazardous Materials, Safety Recommendations. FGDEA Report compiled with Vent Design Recommendations, Contour Maps, Emergency Response Guidelines, Mitigation Measures, and Risk Assessment.

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